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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MORLEY WILSON and 





v. ) Case No. 16612 







BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was initiated pursuant to the provisions of Sec-
tion 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, to review a 
decision of the State Engineer dated January 10, 1968, reject-
ing four applications to appropriate water. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This action was dismissed with prejudice (R. 29) on Respond-
ent's Motion to Dismiss (R. 17) which was filed pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amend-
ed, for failure of Plaintiffs-Appellants to prosecute this action 
to final judgment in the District Court within two years after it 
was initiated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to affirm the Order of the District Court 
dismissing this action with prejudice and to sustain the con-
stitutionality of Section 73-3-15. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not believe there is any substantial dis~. 
between the parties concerning the basic facts of this case, t 
there is disagreement between the parties concerning the lega; 
significance of certain events that have transpired. Since 
Appellants have elected to rely on their Memorandum in the tr: 
court as their brief in this Court, the traditional statement 
facts with citations to the record has not been presented tot 
Court. Consequently, it is believed that a sununary of the per: 
ent facts will be helpful in evaluating the legal arguments wb. 
follow. 
This action was filed on March 11, 1968, to review a decis: 
of the State Engineer rejecting four applications to appropri~ 
water from the Escalante Valley Groundwater Basin in Iron Count 
Utah (R. 1). Respondent State Engineer answered the Complaint 
on April 22, 1968 (R. 2). Very little transpired until the mat: 
was set for Trial on September 17, 1973 (R. 3). That Trial set· 
ting was vacated because of illness of the Plaintiff (the prese: 
Appellants' predecessor in interest) (R. 4). The lower court 
again set this matter for Trial on May 4, 1977 (R. 5). Follow1: 
receipt of this notice, Appellants requested the lower court to 
vacate the Trial setting. This request was contained in a letU 
to the lower court dated April 20, 1977, and sets forth Appellar 
reasons for the request (R. 6). The lower court granted that IE 
quest. Then, on May 17, 1977, Appellants filed a motion to sub· 
2 
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stitute Appellants as plaintiffs (R. 13), accompanied by a stip-
ulation from Respondent to this substitution (R. 12). The lower 
court granted this motion on May 19, 1977 (R. 11). 
On January 10, 1978, the trial court, on its own motion, 
issued an Order to the parties to appear on March 6, 1978, and 
show cause why this action should not be dismissed for failure 
to prosecute (R. 8). Following receipt of this Order, Appellants 
(on February 13, 1978) filed a request for Trial setting (R. 9). 
On March 6, 1978, the Court provided by Minute Entry that the 
Order to Show Cause be stricken and the matter again be 
set for Trial (R. 14). 
Appellants filed "Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories to Defend-
ant" on October 3, 1978 (R. 15). On October 16, 1978, Respondent 
filed a Motion to Dismiss this action pursuant to the provisions 
of Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Upon 
motion of Respondent, the lower court granted an extension within 
which to answer Appellants' Interrogatories, pending disposition 
of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (R. 21). Following briefing 
and oral argument by the parties, the lower court granted Respond-
ent's Motion (R. 29), and Appellants filed this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, man-
dates the dismissal of any action to review a decision of the 
St3te Engineer wl1ich is not prosecuted to final judgment in the 
3 
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the district court within two years after it is filed. More 
than ten years elapsed between the initiation of this action c 
March 11, 1968, and the filing of Respondent's Motion to Dis~ 
on October 16, 1978. The questions before this Court are w~-
ther the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this 
acticn with prejudice and, if not, whether Section 73-3-15 is 
constitutional statute. 
II. THIS ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 73-3-15 
A. Introduction 
It should be noted that the majority of Appellants' 
Memorandum before the trial court-which now constitutes their 
brief before this Court-consists of arguments attacking the 
constitutionality of Section 73-3-15. However, Appellants alsc 
assert that Respondent had, by his actions, waived, and is 
estopped to assert the provisions of Section 73-3-15 (Points !'1 
and v, Appellants' Memorandum) . In Point VI, Appellants atternr [ 
to distinguish Dansie v. Lambert, 542 P.2d 742 (Utah 1975) for 
these reasons. This Court, in the Dansie case, construed the 
dismissal provisions of Section 73-3-15 as mandatory. In May C:1 
this year this Court again affirmed the mandatory nature of th; 
statute in Provo City v. Hansen (::Jo. 15772, May 14, 1979). Ap-
pellants' Memorandum does not adc. _-es:o th is latter case. Appar-
' ently Appellants concede that so. -c. ::e•v ground-such as the uncc, 
sti tutionali ty of the statute-is rec:;uired for them to pre'1ail 
in this action. 
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B. Effect of Dansie v. Lambert and Provo City v. Hansen 
It seems clear beyond question that the decisions of 
this Court in Dansie v. Lambert, supra, and Provo City v. Hansen, 
supra, which construe the meaning of Section 73-3-15, mandate 
the dismissal of this action and fully support the action taken 
by the lower court. Section 73-3-15 specifies that the action 
must be concluded in the trial court within two years and "All 
suits heretofore or hereafter commenced must be dismissed 
unless such suits are or were prosecuted to final judgment within 
the time specified above; This Court first construed 
this legislation in Dansie v. Lambert, supra, approximately four 
years ago. In that action, an appeal was taken from a decision 
of the State Engineer, but the action was still pending some 
twenty-six months after the Complaint had been filed. The trial 
court granted a motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice 
as to all defendants, including the State Engineer (even though 
the State Engineer did not join in the motion to dismiss) . On 
appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the trial court and 
held that the language of Section 73-3-15 was mandatory and that 
the trial court had no option but to dismiss the action. In so 
doing, this Court stated: 
Some may not approve the legislation, subject of 
this case, but in substance and effect it is nothing 
more nor less than a limitations statute, which may 
be displeasing to one who is its victim, but which 
like other similar statutes is one of repose, designed 
to put a time barrier against ~itigation'. in determin-
ing the precious water rights in this arid state. W~ 
are not they that may question the wisdom of the l~gis­
lature on any constitutional or prejudiciality basis 
under the circumstances here. 
5 
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Plaintiff does not claim the statute is or is 
not mandatory. His sole point on appeal is that 
the trial judge erred in granting the motion as to 
the Engineer. The fallacy of the contention lies 
in the fact that the statute has nothing to do with 
joinder of parties, dismissal as to parties and the 
like, but simply applies to the life or death of a 
cause of action. If plaintiff should contend that 
the statute is not mandatory, then in addition to 
other authorities unnecessary to cite here, this 
court, in a very recent case, Herr v. Salt Lake 
County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah) 1974, and cases therein 
mentioned, seem to be quite dispositive as to any 
interpretation of the words "shall" and "must" used 
in the statute here (73-3-15), as being anything but 
mandatory, and not discretionary. (542 P.2d at 744; 
Emphasis supplied by the Court) . 
Within the last six months this Court again considered the 
impact of the dismissal provisions of Section 73-3-15 in Provo 
City v. Hansen, supra. This action was an appeal from a decis1c 
of the State Engineer conditionally approving a change applicat:, 
The action had been pending for approximately three years, and 
some discovery had taken place when the Intervenors in the suit 
filed to dismiss it with prejudice. The trial court granted th:·. 
I 
motion, and this Court affirmed the mandatory nature of the pro·
1 
visions of Section 73-3-15 and reaffirmed the principles announc' 
in the Dansie decision: 
The first sentence of the above-quoted provision 
gives the court discretion to dismiss an action upon 
the grounds of Rule 41 generally, including failure 
to prosecute with diligence. However, if over.two 
years have elapsed since the filing of the action, a 
plaintiff has failed to prosecute with diligence as a 
matter of law and the court must dismiss the action. 
This Court has clearly ruled upon the mandatory nature 
of this provision. In Dansie v. Lambert the Court 
made the following observation: 
If plaintiff should contend that the statute is 
not mandatory, then in addition to other auth-
6 
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orities unnecessary to cite here, this court, 
in a very recent case, Herr v. Salt Lake County, 
525 P.2d 728 (Utah), 1974, and cases therein 
mentioned, seem to be quite dispositive as to 
any interpretation of the words 'shall' and 'must' 
us~d in the statute here (73-3-15), as being any-
thing but mandatory, and not discretionary. 
The reasons for the mandatory nature of the dismissal 
are also articulated in Dansie as follows: 
Some may not approve the legislation, subject 
of this case, but in substance and effect it is 
nothing more nor less than a limitations statute, 
which may be displeasing to one who is its vic-
tim, but which like other similar statutes is one 
of repose, designed to put a time barrier against 
litigation, in determining the precious water 
rights in this arid state . . . • 
From the pleadings it is clear that plaintiffs have 
failed to prosecute the suit to final judgment within 
two years after it was filed, and the dismissal was 
therefore proper. 
The Court also held that the dismissal with prejudice was 
proper because to do otherwise would allow a plaintiff to cir-
cumvent~and would be contrary to~the purpose of the statute: 
Plaintiff's argument that the trial court abused 
its discretion in dismissing the action with prejudice 
rather than without prejudice is without merit. To 
dismiss without prejudice is to give a party an addi-
tional one year within which to commence a new action 
to final judgment. Such a result is contrary to the 
whole tenor of the statute and hence, the dismissal 
must be with prejudice. The provision that an action 
to review the State Engineer's decision shall be dis-
missed if not filed within 60 days after notice of 
the decision precludes the filing of a "new action" 
in water cases of this type. 
This Court's rulings in the Dansie and Provo City cases 
are completely dispositive of this appeal, and the decision of 
the lower court should be affirmed. 
7 
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.. 
C. No Waiver or Estoppel 
Appellants attempt to develop the argument (at Points 
IV and V of their Memorandum) that Respondent has somehow "wa: 
or is "estopped" to assert the dismissal provisions of Sectior. 
7 3-3-15. However, this Court noted in the Provo City case the: 
The mandatory language of the act requires a 
plaintiff to take advantage of other remedies 
available to him within the allotted time where 
the opposing party attempts to purposefully delay 
the case. In any event, we are not convinced 
that anyone in the instant case was responsible 
for the delay other than plaintiff. (See Footnote 
No. 3). 
Further, as will be shown in the following section of this 
Brief, there is absolutely no basis for asserting that Responde 
in any way delayed the trial of this matter or provided any bas. 
for Appellants to assert waiver or estoppel. What the record 
does show is that every delay and postponement that has occurre. 
in this action has been at the request of Appellants. The fac: 
is that this action had been pending for over ten years when R~ 
pendent filed his Motion to Dismiss, and had been set 
twice~with both settings continued at the request of 
for Tria1 I 
Appellant: I 
None of the delays in this action have been caused by Responden: 
Appellants have had more than ample opportunity to conclude th1: 
action, but have failed to do so. It is not Respondent's resp~ 
sibility to see that Appellants properly pursue their case: 
Respondent further contends that the doctrine 
of estoppel has application to proceedings of this 
nature; that if the defendant rests his oars and 
permits the case to remain untried he should not 
be heard to complain; and that in any event he must 
8 
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show prejudice. But "it is the plaintiff upon whom 
the duty rests to use diligence at every stage of 
the proceeding to expedite his case to a final deter-
mination." J.C. Penney Co. v. Superior Court, Cal.App., 
336 P. 2d 545. (Thran v. First Judicial District Court, 
380 P. 2d 297 (Nev. 1963)). 
Respondent was never asked to waive the requirements of Sec-
tion 73-3-15, and certainly would not have done so had he been 
approached on this subject. There is absolutely nothing in the 
record to suggest otherwise. Respondent's lack of resistance 
to Appellants' efforts to delay trial of this case cannot now be 
used against Respondent to justify Appellants' inaction. This is 
clear beyond question. In addition to Provo City v. Hansen, supra, 
see Johnson v. Harber, 582 P.2d 800 (Nev. 1978); Bank of Nevada v. 
Friedman, 476 P.2d 172 (Nev. 1970); Featherstone v. Hanson, 338 
P.2d 298 (N.M. 1959); Miller & Lux v. Superior Court, 219 Pac. 
1006 (Calif. 1923); and Taylor v. Shultz, 144 Cal. Rep. 114 (Calif. 
1978). The cases cited by Appellants simply do not support the 
argument which they assert under the facts of this case. 
Appellants' effort to shift the blame onto Respondent for 
their failure to pursue this action basically falls into three 
broad categories. First, Appellants argue that Respondent is 
foreclosed from advocating dismissal of this action because Res-
pondent did not raise this matter sooner. In this regard, Appel-
lants are critical of Respondent for such actions as stipulating 
to the substitution of Appellants as parties; not objecting to 
the continuances requested by Appellants; and failing to urge 
the trial court to dismiss this action when that court noticed 
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
up the dismissal of this action on its own motion. Secondly, 
Appellants assert that Respondent's conduct caused them to pur-
chase land which they would not have other.vise purchased. And 
third, Appellants claim that for a portion of the time this 
action was pending Appellants were apparently represented by a:. 
unlicensed attorney. None of these arguments have any merit. 
1. Respondent's Actions before the Trial Court 
As pointed out above, Respondent's responsibility 
as defendant in this action is to meet Appellants step by step 
as the action p regresses . It is not Respondent's place to tell 
Appellants how to structure their lawsuit and what the impacts 
may be if various alternative courses are followed. With respe: 
to Respondent's stipulating that the present Appellants couldb; 
substituted as plaintiffs, that is all the Stipulation containe: 
(R. 12). This was a pro forma act by Respondent, . 1 I and certain 1· I 
did not require Respondent to completely evaluate his case at 
that time and advise Appellants what legal strategies he would 
follow in the future. Appellants never requested a stipulatior. I 
from Respondent that he do any more than simply agree to a sub-
stitution of parties, and that is all that Stipulation did. It, 
I 
did not in any way purport to define Respondent's future conduc:\ 
litigation, and does not foreclose Respondent from asse:
1
, in this 
ing the provisions of Section 73-3-15. See Featherstone v. Har.-
~, supra, Thran v. First Judicial District Court, supra, and 
Taylor v. Shultz, supra. 
Appellants are also critical of Respondent =or 3cqu~escinq 
10 
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in continuances of trial dates, but Appellants conveniently 
overlook the fact that it was they who wanted the trial dates 
postponed~and not Respondent. For Appellants to now claim 
that Respondent must accept the responsibility for Appellants 
having had the trial of the case continued on two different 
occasions is ludicrous. It is also important to note that 
Appellants were assigned the prior plaintiff's interest in this 
action in August of 1976 (Ex. 2 to R. 7), but did not petition 
the lower court to substitute parties plaintiff until May of 
1977 (R. 13). 
Appellants also criticize Respondent for not joining with 
the lower court when that court~on its own motion-:--was going 
to dismiss this action for Appellants' failure to prosecute 
(R. 8). This action was initiated by the lower court on its 
own motion in order to dispose of this stale litigation. This 
action by the lower court was, of course, not initiated under 
the provisions of Section 73-3-15. Respondent had no obligation 
to join with the court in this court-initiated action. Further, 
the lower court did not pursue the matter. It simply struck 
the Order to Show Cause and stated that the matter would be set 
for Trial (R. 14). This was apparently done on Appellants' rep-
resentation that the matter was ready for Trial (R. 9). However, 
the plain fact is that Appellants filed their Request for Trial 
Setting in February of 1978 (R. 9), but did not initiate discov-
ery in this action until October of that year when they submitted 
11 
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their first interrogatories to Respondent (R. 15). It is 
obvious from even a cursory reading of those interrogatories 
that much of the information being sought demonstrates that 
Appellants were still only in the initial stages of getting 
this matter prepared for Trial. And this was over ten years 
after the action had been filed. What the foregoing comes 
down to is nothing more than a thinly-disguised effort on the 
part of Appellants to shift the responsibility to Respondent 
for actions which Appellants have taken to delay this litiga-
tion. 
2. Aopellants' Purchase of Property 
In a further effort to convince this Court that 
Respondent is somehow responsible for Appellants' situation, 
Appellants assert that their purchase of certain land was a 
direct result of Respondent's conduct. This is absolutely un-
true, as will be demonstrated by the following discussion. The 
contract of sale for the property involved is attached to Appel·I 
lants' Memorandum as Exhibit 2. This document is dated August I 
6, 1976, but Appellants waited until the following April to haVE! 
the sale approved by the probate court (R. 7) . This contract 
involved the sale of private property which does not involve 
Respondent in any way, and Appellants do not allege that it does 
Rather, Appellants adopt the curious argument that this contract 
would not have been executed if Appellants were not somehow goi; 
to receive the cooperation of Respondent. For Appellants to 
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claim that a contract in which Respondent was not involved 
could in some way operate to dictate the future conduct of 
Respondent is ridiculous: 
But there is an even more fundamental flaw in Appellants' 
logic~and perhaps in their business judgment as well~if they 
predicated their purchase of this ~and upon these applications. 
The four applications involved in this lawsuit were rejected 
by the State Engineer. Neither Appellants nor-their predecessor 
had any right whatsoever to use any water under these filings 
unless the decision of the State Engineer was reversed. Thus, 
at the time this contract was executed, there was absolutely no 
water right in existence under the subject applications. This 
is not a situation of the State Engineer changing his position 
and telling a water user that he no longer has a water right 
which the State Engineer had previously granted. Rather, it is 
a situation where the State Engineer has taken the position that 
there is no unappropriated water in the area, and he has pursued 
a consistent course of action to sustain that determination. See 
McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948) and Whit-
more v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d 954 (1949). 
Another large gap in Appellants' argument is that the four 
applications involved in this appeal are not even filed for the 
land covered by this contract. This agreement covers the pur-
chase by Appellants of 960 acres located in the East 1/2 of 
Section 7 and Section 9, T32S, Rl3W, SLB&M (1[1, Ex. 2 of Appel-
lants' Memorandum). None of these applications were filed on 
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this acreage. Applications Nos. 24625 and 24626 were filed 
for irrigation of land in Section 17, T31S, Rl3W, SLB&M. App-
lication No. 24624 sought to appropriate water for use in part 
of Section 20, T31S, Rl3W, SLB&M, and Application No. 24627 
covers a portion of Section 23, T31S, Rl3W, SLB&M. 
In sum, Appellants have offered absolutely no basis for 
arguing to this Court that Respondent was in any way responsib: 
for Appellants' purchase of property, and are being less than 
candid with this Court to suggest otherwise. 
3. Appellants' Change of Attorneys 
It is difficult to see the relevance of the argume, 
made by Appellants concerning the prior plaintiff's attorney. 
The fact that that attorney had his license suspended for non-
payment of license fees is totally immaterial. No one was awa: 
of this fact until Appellants' present counsel raised the matlt 
But Appellants do not argue~nor could they~that this somehow 
denied the prior plaintiff access to the court. It did not. 
Prior counsel had full and complete participation in the actior. 
to the extent he desired to do so. Further, it is interesting 
to note that that attorney was an active member of the Utah Ba: 
for over a three-year period after this action was filed~which 
is one year beyond the time frame provided in Section 73-3-15 
for conclusion of this action in the trial court. Carelessness 
or neglect of counsel will not serve to toll the statute (~ 
v. Cook, 137 Cal.Rptr. 434 (Calif. 1977) and Brown v. Lufkin 
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Foundry & Machine Co., 487 P.2d 1104 (N.M. 1971)). 
In affirming the dismissal of an action for failure to pro-
secute under the New Mexico statute dealing with the dismissal 
of actions where the argument was made~among others~that the 
changing of counsel was grounds for preserving the action beyond 
the statutory period, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that: 
With respect to the third assertion, claiming 
either a waiver or estoppel, it is agreed by the 
parties that there was never any agreement or 
apparently even discussion between any of the 
attorneys with respect to a stipulation of waiver 
of the two-year limitation. Actually, the only 
claim of consequence upon which plaintiff relies 
is the fact that after the two-year statute had 
run from the date of the filing of the original 
complaint, plaintiff's original attorneys were 
discharged, new attorneys employed, settlement 
negotiations entered into, depositions of the par-
ties taken, and substantial sums paid by the plain-
tiff to his new attorneys for fees and costs. It 
should be mentioned that, according to the corres-
pondence between plaintiff and his new attorneys, 
one of the main purposes of the taking of the depo-
sitions was in order that the new attorneys could 
competently advise the plaintiff as to the possible 
outcome of the litigation. 
We fail to see anything in any of the actions 
on behalf of the defendant which would create an 
estoppel. There is nothing before us to even in-
timate any promise, duty or holding out on the part 
of the defendant upon which the plaintiff relied 
which could in this case bring the doctrine of es-
toppel to bear. Plaintiff's situation was not 
worsened by reason of any of the acts of the defend-
ant. See State ex rel. Fitzhugh v. City Council of 
Hot Springs, 1952, 56 N.M. 118, 241 P.2d 100; Con-
tinental Pacific Lines v. Superior Court, 1956, 142 
Cal.App.2d 744, 299 P.2d 417; and Ruby v. Wellington, 
Cal.App.1958, 327 P.2d 586. Certainly~ t~e ~efe~d-. 
ant cannot be held responsible for plaintiff s diffi-
culty, whatever it was, with his own highly reputable 
attorneys. 
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In view of our prior pronouncements with respect 
to the statute, we are unable to find in this case 
anything which would amount to a waiver on the part 
of the defendant to file his motion. There was no 
conduct on the part of the defendant causing any 
actual delay. The fact that the defendant did not 
file his motion immediately upon the expiration of 
the two years is certainly not a waiver. There is 
no duty on the part of the defendant to bring the 
case to trial, this responsibility being entirely 
upon the plaintiff, and the plaintiff failed to do 
so. See Ernrnco Ins. Co. v. Walker, 1953, 57 N.M. 
525, 260 P.2d 712; and Pettine v. Rogers, supra. 
(Featherstone v. Hanson, supra at 300 (1959)). 
Also, it must be remembered that it was these Appellants 
who requested that the most recent trial setting be vacated in 
May of 1977 (R. 6), which was approximately nine months after 
the Appellants purchased the rejected applications involved in 
this litigation (Ex. 2 to R. 7). Thus, these Appellants had 
asserted an interest in this litigation for over two years be-
fore Respondent filed his Motion to Dismiss. Further, after 
all the delays that had occurred, it was not until October of 
1978 that Appellants initiated discovery in this case (R. 15). 
But the relevant point here is that the provisions of Sec-
tion 73-3-15 apply to the cause of action, and not to who the 
parties are at any particular time or what counsel represents 
them. This is absolutely clear from the terms of the statute, 
and to suggest otherwise would totally defeat the purpose and 
goal of this legislation. As pointed out in the Dansie case, 
"The fallacy of the contention lies in the fact that the statu~ 
has nothing to do with joinder of parties, dismissal as to par-
lG 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ties and the like, but simply applies to the life or death of 
a cause of action" (542 P.2d at 744). It comes down to this~ 
this Court, in Dansie and Provo City, left no room for equivo-
cation or exception, and, try as they might, Appellants cannot 
distinguish or escape the clear and unmistakable language of 
those opinions. The fact is that this case, which had been 
pending for more than ten years, was properly dismissed by the 
lower court. The burden is upon Appellants to show that the 
trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this action, 
and Appellants have failed to sustain this burden (Thompson Ditch 
Co. v. Jackson, 29 Ut.2d 259, 508 P.2d 529 (1973) and Westing-
house v. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876 (Ut. 1975)). 
III. SECTION 73-3-15 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE 
POWER AND IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
A. Preface 
In an effort to escape the clear and unequivocal deci-
sions of this Court, Appellants have sought to have Section 73-3-15 
declared unconstitutional. At Points I, II and III of their Memo-
randum, Appellants raise and discuss three separate arguments in 
a vain attempt to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of this 
legislation. Each of these arguments is answered below, but it 
must also be remembered that there is a strong presumption of the 
constitutionality of any statute, and if there is any doubt as to 
the validity of any act, the court has an obligation to resolve 
it in favor of its constitutionality. Further, a court will not 
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judge an act invalid unless in its judgment there is a clear, 
complete and unmistakable constitutional violation, and the 
whole burden of proving the unconstitutionality lies upon the 
party asserting that position. Plaintiffs have totally failed 
in that regard in each of the constitutional objections they 
have raised in this action (Gubler v. Utah State Teachers' Re-
tirement Board, 113 Utah 188, 192 P. 2d 580 (1948); Patterick v. 
Carbon Water Conservancy District, 106 Utah 55, 145 P.2d 503 
(1944); Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 19" 
P.2d 477 (1948); State Water Pollution Control Board v. Salt L; 
City, 6 Ut.2d 247, 311 P.2d 370 (1957)). 
B. No Violation of Separation of Powers 
Appellants first argue that the dismissal provision of 
Section 73-3-15 is unconstitutional because it violates the se;· 
aration of powers principle provided for in Section 1, Article 
of the Utah Constitution. The essence of Appellants' arg~~ent 
is that the mandatory effect of this statute is an unconstitu-
tional intrusion into the judiciary because it is telling the 
courts how and when to decide matters. The basic fallacy of 
Appellants' argument-and the one in which they seer.i to persist-
is that the mandate of §73-3-15 is totally and squarely with tr.Er 
Appellants, and not with the Court. The impact of this statute 
is simply that when a water user appeals a decision of the StatE 
Engineer, he does so with the express knowledge and condition 
that he must conclude the litigation in the trial court within 
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a two-year period or must suffer the consequences of the statute. 
This is not unreasonable, and does provide to any litigant who is 
interested in actively pursuing such an appeal sufficient time to 
conclude it in the trial court. Appellants certainly are in no 
position to complain about a two-year time period when this action 
has been pending for over ten years, and has been set for Trial 
twice~only to be vacated at Appellants' request. 
Section 73-3-15 is not the type of legislation referred to in 
the cases cited in Appellants' Memorandum as constituting an in-
terference with a judicial function. Rather, it embodies a valid 
exercise of legislative power dealing with the limitation of an 
action, and is clearly constitutional. That a state may constitu-
tionally place reasonable limitations on actions is not open to 
question: 
A state may constitutionally shorten the periods 
of limitation fixed by previously existing statutes 
and make the amended statute applicable to existing 
causes of action, provided it affords a reasonable 
time within which suits for such existing causes of 
action may be commenced. What is a reasonable time 
is for the determination of the legislature and the 
court will not interfere with the legislative discre-
tion, unless the time allowed is so manifestly in-
sufficient that it amounts to a denial of justice. 
(Wolfe v. Phillips, 172 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1949); 
Emphasis added) . 
In Tucker v. McCrory, 266 P.2d 433 (Okla. 1954), the Oklahoma 
Supreme court upheld a limitations statute against a claim that 
it was a legislative usurping of judicial power: 
Defendants argue that sub-section (6) above qu~ted, 
violates Article IV, sec. 1 of the Oklahoma Constitu-
tion as a legislative usurpation of judicial power 
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.. "'. (~) state may constitutionally shorten the 
~eriods of limitation fixed by previously exist-
ing statut7s and make the amended statute applic-
able to existing causes of action, provided it 
affords a reasonable time within which suits for 
such causes .... may be conunenced. (226 P.2d 434 
435). , 
See also United States v. Morena, 245 U.S. 392 (1918); Sparlir. 
v. Refunding Board, 71 S.W.2d 182 (Ark. 1934). Clearly the 
time allowed under Section 73-3-15 is reasonable when measurec 
against the overall public purpose of effective control over 
the administration and utilization of the limited water resoun 
of this State. 
Appellants' reliance on Atchison, T.& S.F. Ry. Co. v. Long 
251 Pac. 486 (Okla. 1926) and Lindauer v. Allen, 456 P.2d 851 
(Nev. 1969) is misplaced. In Atchison, the legislation provi& 
that the district courts were to try certain classes of cases 
within ten days. Such is not the case here~the burden is on 
the Appellants, and not the Court. Further, the time frame in· 
valved in Atchison was only ten days (within which the trial 
court had to try the matter after the defendant answered) and 
was unrealistic and unreasonable. However, the two years allo• 
for Appellants in this litigation to get their case tried is £1 
and reasonable. Appellants have had two opportunities over a 
year period within which to conclude this action, but are no 
closer now than when the action was filed. The Lindauer case, 
supra, involved an express conflict between the time frame for 
dismissal for failure to prosecute as specified in the !Jevada 
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Supreme Court's rules and a statute. The Nevada Supreme court 
affirmed the dismissal of the action, concluding that the time 
specified in the court's rules prevailed and voided the statute. 
No such conflict exists here. But in any event, as discussed 
above, there is no basic constitutional problem with the Legis-
lature having placed such limitations on actions. Also see 
Schultz v. Schultz, 70 Cal.A.2d 293, 161 P.2d 36 (Calif. 1945); 
Denver Local Union v. Perry Truck Lines, 106 Colo. 83, 101 P.2d 
436 (Colo. 1940); and Town of Chino Valley v. State Land Dept., 
580 P.2d 704 (Ariz. 1978). 
C. No Violation of Equal Protection or Due Process 
Appellants' second constitutional argument is that 
Section 73-3-15 violates the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 7, 
Article I of the Utah Constitution because persons involved in 
appeals of State Engineer's decisions before the enactment of 
Section 73-3-15 are not treated exactly the same as those after 
enactment of this statute. Laws must have a beginning, and the 
Legislature certainly is not prevented or prohibited from making 
changes which affect the rights, duties and obligations of par-
ties involved in litigation or otherwise (Sperry & Hutchison Co. 
v. Rhodes, 220 U.S. 502 (1911)). The Fourteenth Amendment does 
not forbid statutes or statutory changes treating rights that 
existed prior to enactment of a statute differently from rights 
created after enactment of a statute. 
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Obviously, in the case of §73-3-15, the Legislature had t 
devise a system to dispose of cases already in existence wher 
the statute was enacted, and the method it chose is fair and 
reasonable, and certainly has not resulted in the kinds of 
excesses that Appellants have attempted to conjure up in thei: 
argument. Whether the method chosen is an ideal one-or whet: 
there may be other possible solutions-is immaterial so long , 
the legislation adequately treats and provides a solution for 
both categories of litigation. There is no requirement that 
the two categories must be treated exactly the same. Equal pr 
tection does not require that legislation provide exactly the 
same procedure for different classes of litigants: 
Nor does the equal protection clause exact uni-
forrni ty of procedure. The legislature may class-
ify litigation and adopt one type of procedure 
for one class and a different type for another. 
(Dobany v. Rogers, 284 U.S. 362 (1929)). 
Due process does not guarantee a particular form or method 
of procedure: 
Due process of law guarantees to every citizen 
the right to have that course of legal procedure 
which has been es~ablished in our judicial system 
for the enforcement and protection of private rights 
(citations omitted). It contemplates that the de-
fendant shall be given fair notice, and afforded a 
real opportunity to be heard and defend (citations 
omitted), in an orderly procedure, before Judgment 
is rendered against him. (State v. Chillingsworth, 
171 So. 649 (Fl. 1936)). 
In the case of Section 73-3-15, it was necessary that the Legi 
lature provide a procedure to deal with those individuals who 
a?pealed decisions of the State Engineer before the act, becal 
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they were not on notice at the time of filing that their suits 
were subject to dismissal upon two years failure to prosecute. 
Thus, they were given an additional two years to prosecute upon 
receiving notice of the statutory requirement in the form of a 
motion by the other party to dismiss. On the other hand, those 
(like Appellants herein) who filed after enactment of §73-3-15 
were on notice at the time they filed an appeal that their actions 
could be dismissed upon motion of a defendant after two years for 
failure to prosecute. 
Section 73-3-15 is not subject to the challenge that it vio-
lates equal protection by an unreasonable classification. The 
classification therein is reasonably based. It affords to those 
filing both before and after its enactment due process of law in 
the form of notice that they must prosecute their actions with 
expediency. The very classification which Appellants suggest to 
be a violation of equal protection is necessary to preserve due 
process of law to both classes of claimants, and is thus reason-
ably based. 
The cases which Appellants rely on will not support the 
argument they have made. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 
920 (1938), simply supports the general rule that there must be 
a reasonable basis to differentiate between classes or categories 
which are the subject matter of the law in question. Such a basis 
exists here. 
Appellants also cite the New Mexico case of State v. Sunset 
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Ditch Co., 145 P.2d 219 (N.M. 1944), in support of their equal 
protection challenge, alleging that a legislative classifica-
tion based entirely upon a time element, with no reasonable 
relation to the object of the legislation, is unconstitutional. 
However, as Appellants note at page 14 of their Memorandum, 
this Court stated in Dansie that Section 73-3-15 is "designed 
to put a time barrier against litigation, in determining the 
precious water rights in this arid state . . Th us , the tim; 
element is an object of the statute. The legislative classifr 
cation of those filing before and after the act clearly bears , 
reasonable relation to that statutory purpose, and is not con-
stitutionally objectionable. 
D. No Denial of Access to Courts 
Appellants' final constitutional argument is that 
Section 73-3-15 has the effect of closing the courtroom to Appe 
lants in violation of Section 11, Article I, Utah Constitution. 
This is most difficult to understand. Appellants were in court 
for over a decade and had this matter set for Trial twice, but 
yet still maintain that somehow the Court has been closed to tr 
There is simply no basis for making such an argument. The con· 
stitutional guaranty providing for open courts does not create 
any new rights for Appellants, but is merely a broad declarati< 
of a fundamental protection. If Appellants' argument were fol 
ed to its logical conclusion, the Court would never be able to 
dispose of stale litigation. Certainly such a result was neve 
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contemplated by this constitutional provision. Appellants were 
given an express right to present their claim to the Court under 
the provisions of Sections 73-3-14 and 73-3-15, and the Legis-
lature can prescribe the method and manner by which Appellants 
must pursue their appeal without transgressing Article I, Section 
11. If this were not so, the Legislature would never be able to 
specify limitations and conditions on the procedural aspects of 
litigation. This just simply is not the law: 
Plaintiff's counsel, however, also contend 
that the act is unconstitutional because it de-
prives a person whose rights are affected from 
seeking redress in the courts. This contention, 
for the reasons already pointed out, cannot pre-
vail. There is no reason why the Legislature 
may not limit the right to assail the regularity 
of the formation or organization of a district, 
provided a reasonable time is given within which 
to bring an action for that purpose. This is 
practically all that is attempted by the limita-
tion imposed in the act in question. (Horn v. 
Shaffer, 47 Utah 55, 151 Pac. 555, 558 (1915)). 
Also see Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 Pac. 336 (1915) and 
Brown v. Lufkin Foundry and Machine Co., 487 P.2d 1104 (N.M. 
1971). 
Appellants can derive no comfort from Oklahoma City v. Castle-
berry, 413 P.2d 556 (Okla. 1966), upon which they rely to support 
their argument under this point. In that case the court correct-
ly set aside a default judgment against a landowner (who was not 
represented by counsel) because he had been misinformed by one 
of the district judges as to when his case would be heard. Hence, 
the landowner was not present when the hearing was held and his 
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default was entered. Certainly the court was correct in sett 
this default aside. However, that case bears no factual rela-
tion to this matter. Appellants attempt to develop the argum; 
that the trial court was somehow forever foreclosed from dism 
ing this action because it did not do so following issuance o: 
the court's Order to Show Cause on January 10, 1978. This is 
sense~ As previously pointed out in this Brief, this action~ 
on the court's own motion and was not initiated pursuant to tr 
provisions of Section 73-3-15. Further, the trial court did~ 
pursue the rnatter-i t simply struck the Order to Show Cause ar. 
indicated that the matter would be set for Trial (R. 14). ApF, 
lants conveniently overlook the fact that this action has been 
pending for over a decade, during which Appellants had two di! 
erent opportunities to try the case but failed to do so. This 
a far cry from a situation where the courts have been closed t 
party. 
We agree with the appellant that every litigant should 
have his day in court; but he should abide by the rule: 
(Averette v. Hutchinson, 420 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1967)}. 
E. Conclusion 
As a concluding comment, it should be noted that the 
validity of legislation establishing state control over the ad· 
ministration of water has uniformly been upheld in the Western 
United States as a valid exercise of the states' policy power 
against a variety of constitutional objections (Hutchins, ~ 
Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States, Vol. I, P· 314 (Mis 
26 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Pub. No. 1206, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 1971)). There is a 
substantial public interest in sound water right administration. 
Utah's water code had its beginning around the turn of the cen-
tury when various statutory provisions were enacted to afford a 
more active state role in the administration and distribution 
of the water resources of the State. From that time until 1919, 
various statutory provisions were enacted governing Utah's water 
resources. In 1919, the Utah Legislature revised and re-enacted 
a comprehensive water code for the State of Utah which encompassed 
the allocation, distribution and adjudication of the water rights 
of this State. There have, of course, been a number of amendments 
to Utah's water code since that time. The constitutionality of 
this water code has been challenged and, while Section 73-3-15 
was not addressed in that litigation, this Court had no difficulty 
approving and endorsing the constitutionality of those aspects of 
Utah's water code which it has considered. See Spanish Fork West 
Field Irrigation Company v. District Court, 99 Utah 527, 104 P.2d 
353 (1940); Eden Irrigation Company v. District Court of Weber 
County, 61 Utah 103, 211 Pac. 957 (1922); and Huntsville Irriga-
tion Ass'n. v. District Court of Weber County, 72 Utah 431, 270 
Pac. 1090 (1928). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This action~which had been pending for over a decade when 
Respondent filed his Motion to Dismiss~was properly dismissed 
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with prejudice by the trial court for failure to prosecute. 
Appellants have completely failed to demonstrate that the 
trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this action, 
and the decision of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Further, Section 73-3-15 is clearly a constitutional 
exercise of legislative power, and Appellants have failed to 
show otherwise. 
Attorneys for Utah State 
301 Empire Building 
231 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-4446 
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